For more than eighteen months since Ahmad al-Sharaa assumed power in Syria, he has consistently sidestepped the question of democracy. Whenever confronted with it, his answers seem addressed to an entirely different inquiry. He has never explicitly rejected democracy, nor has he offered a clear definition of what he believes it to be. Instead, he has mastered the art of evasion.
His familiar refrain — “If by democracy we mean that the people choose who governs them, then yes, we are moving in that direction” — is not an answer. Reducing democracy to the act of choosing a ruler is fundamentally misleading. Elections alone do not constitute democracy. Authoritarian regimes hold votes, parliaments convene under dictatorships, and many states proudly include the word “Democratic” in their official names while embodying none of its principles.
Elections Are the Beginning, Not the End
Democracy may begin at the ballot box, but it certainly does not end there. Because elections can be staged, manipulated, or reduced to symbolic rituals, far more essential questions must be asked.
Can citizens make a genuinely free choice? Do real political alternatives exist? Can voters replace the leader they elected, or criticize him without fear? Can political losers remain safely active in public life? Most importantly: Do strong, independent institutions exist to prevent an elected leader from becoming an autocrat?
A government does not become democratic simply because citizens voted for it. Democracy requires a regime to accept that the people are the sole source of its legitimacy — and that they possess the power to revoke that legitimacy at any moment. The peaceful, institutionalized transfer of power is therefore the core of democracy. The true test of any democratic system is not how a ruler enters office, but how easily and peacefully they can be removed.
Power Concentration and Institutional Fragility
Measured against these standards, the political architecture emerging around al-Sharaa cannot be described as democratic, nor even as moving toward democracy.
The current Constitutional Declaration grants sweeping executive authority to the president. The mechanisms for forming both the legislative and judicial branches remain under executive control, undermining the separation of powers and crippling the ability of state institutions to hold the presidency accountable.
These concerns are no longer abstract critiques of a legal text. In July 2026, al-Sharaa appointed all seven members of the Supreme Constitutional Court by decree, while the composition and authority of the People’s Assembly remain heavily shaped by executive influence. Under such conditions, describing the emerging system as democratic simply because it promises future elections is untenable.
After decades of totalitarian rule, it is tempting to define democracy as the mere opposite of the Assad regime: Assad was never elected; therefore, anyone elected must be democratic. This logic is deeply flawed. Democracy is not the absence of Bashar al-Assad; it is the construction of a system that prevents any ruler — regardless of name or ideology — from becoming another Bashar al-Assad.
To build citizenship alongside a nation, Syria does not need a regime that says, “Choose your ruler.” It needs a system that guarantees: “Even if you choose poorly, independent institutions will prevent your ruler from becoming a tyrant.” Constitutions, independent judiciaries, empowered parliaments, a free press, political parties, civil society, and labor unions are not decorative details; they are the essential safeguards against the return of authoritarianism.
Democracy cultivates citizens who understand that public authority is not the personal property of a ruler, that disagreement is not treason, that opposition is not a foreign conspiracy, and that losing an election is not the destruction of the homeland.
This reality confronts al-Sharaa with a fundamental question: Are we building a post-Assad state, or a state that makes the reproduction of Assad impossible?
The Misuse of “Syrian Exceptionalism” and “Consensus”
Al-Sharaa and his inner circle frequently invoke “Syrian exceptionalism” to reject imported governance models. The problem is not the principle of cultural specificity itself, but the selective and instrumental way it is deployed.
When the topic is checks and balances, judicial independence, or opposition rights, “Syrian exceptionalism” is invoked to dismiss established democratic norms. Yet when structuring military hierarchy, consolidating executive power, or designing presidential mechanisms, specificity suddenly poses no obstacle to adopting foreign practices.
Is a governance system inherently “more Syrian” simply because it lacks democratic checks? Who decided that executive appointment of parliamentary members reflects authentic Syrian identity? Without clear definitions, “Syrian exceptionalism” risks becoming a contemporary euphemism for authoritarianism — much like past invocations of “state necessity” or “the public interest.”
The term “consensus” (tawafuq) is similarly overused during this transitional phase. While consensus is valuable in a society emerging from dictatorship and war, it cannot replace genuine political life. Democracy does not assume a naturally unified society; it acknowledges deep internal differences and builds institutions to manage them peacefully. The goal is not to force Syrians to agree, but to enable them to disagree without turning political rivalry into violence or accusations of treason.
Protecting the Political Minority
Democracy does not assume that the public is infallible or that every popular vote produces good governance. It assumes the opposite: citizens can err, and leaders can corrupt. Therefore, absolute power is never entrusted to the elected; it is constrained by constitutional limits, independent institutions, and fundamental rights that no majority may override.
Crucially, democracy protects the political minority from the majority, ensuring that today’s majority does not become tomorrow’s permanent oligarchy. In a functioning democracy, the opposition is not a defeated faction waiting for executive permission to speak, but a viable government-in-waiting seeking to persuade the electorate through peaceful, legal means. Protecting the opposition is the ultimate guarantee of peaceful power transfer.
Ultimately, the central issue is not whether al-Sharaa utters the word “democracy” as if it were a magical incantation or a test of legitimacy. What must be demanded is the construction of a political system in which Syrians can freely elect their leaders, criticize those in power, organize opposition parties, assemble peacefully, and replace their government through the ballot box — all while knowing that the fall of a ruler does not mean the collapse of the state.
If Syria moves in this direction, the formal label attached to the system will matter little. But if citizens are merely offered the chance to vote for a ruler without the institutions to restrain him, repeating the word “democracy” a thousand times will not make the regime democratic.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
The post The Democracy Ahmad al-Sharaa Avoids Naming first appeared on The Syrian Observer.
