Red flags missed, warnings ignored: The intelligence failures now haunting Australia after Bondi terror attack

By NICHOLAS COMINO, POLITICAL REPORTER, AUSTRALIA Published: 07:19, 24 May 2026 | Updated: 07:19, 24 May 2026 Australia's top intelligence agency flagged the alleged Bondi attackers as potential risks as early as 2019, but a string of systemic failures meant the brothers passed unchallenged through known extremist channels. As revealed by The Daily Telegraph ahead of journalist Sharri Markson's new book, Bondi Terror, father and son Sajid and Naveed Akram allegedly slipped through gaping holes in national security in the years leading up to the deadly December attack. The failures stemmed from a catastrophic breakdown in intelligence sharing. Both the Australian Federal Police and Border Force allegedly knew the Akrams had travelled to regions associated with extremist activity, but failed to pass those warnings to ASIO or NSW Police, leaving key agencies in the dark. Investigators later confirmed the pair had travelled to Uzbekistan, widely viewed as a gateway to Afghanistan and other conflict zones, in late 2022 or early 2023. Yet despite years of warnings about such routes, the trip did not prompt the increased scrutiny experts had previously called for. ASIO had already scrutinised Naveed Akram in 2019, including multiple interviews with his father, Sajid. The agency found Naveed had ties to individuals of concern but determined that neither man met the threshold of a violent extremist at the time. The passports used by the Akrams (pictured) which they used to travel to terror hotspots  The Akram's travelled to a number places with links to the Islamic state before the Bondi attack However, ASIO's assessment came with a clear warning: if the Akrams again surfaced among 'persons of interest', their case should be reopened and re-examined. According to Bondi Terror, that reassessment never happened. The original assessment was signed off at a mid-level within ASIO and never reached senior review. Information from Australia's intelligence partners, including the US and Israel, later emerged showing the brothers had allegedly tried to reach Afghanistan on foot from Uzbekistan, though apparently without success. They also travelled to Saudi Arabia in the years before the attack, a journey that may have been for legitimate religious reasons, including a pilgrimage to Mecca. But the gravest failures came in the months before the attack. Border Force and the AFP had allegedly flagged not only the earlier Uzbekistan trip, but also a journey to Mindanao in the southern Philippines, an area notorious for terror links, just one month before the attack. Despite these glaring alerts, the information was allegedly never passed on to ASIO or NSW Police. The Akram's travelled to Mindanao, where ISIS operates, staying at the GV Hotel in Davao (file) It is alleged that the ABF and AFP did not pass on information about the Akram's to ASIO  The Bondi Terror revelations echo concerns now before the highest levels of government. The Royal Commission into antisemitism and social cohesion's interim report has identified severe loopholes in the way Australia tracks and shares details on high-risk travellers, while key reforms remain out of public view. The report found Home Affairs, through Australian Border Force, relies on multiple travel alert systems, holdovers from before the ABF was established, creating a fragmented and inconsistent web instead of a single, coordinated intelligence network. It warned this lack of integration can delay or even block vital, time-sensitive intelligence and urged the government to consolidate alert systems wherever possible. However, the report stops short of detailing what changes may come. Its most sensitive findings, including any overhaul of how Border Force handles travel alerts, remain classified. The Commission has also highlighted ongoing issues with intelligence sharing across different security levels. Without compatible systems and sufficient clearances, agencies cannot quickly or safely exchange information. Four recommendations in this section of the report have been fully redacted. Sorry we are not currently accepting comments on this article.