Proposed US-Saudi nuclear energy deal: What we know so far

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Citing people familiar with the discussions, the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times reported on Tuesday that Trump is expected to ask Congress to approve the agreement, which could pave the way for US companies to help build Saudi Arabia’s nuclear industry. The timing is likely to prove controversial, with the US saying one of the objectives of its military campaign against Iran is to prevent it from acquiring the ability to build a nuclear weapon. Critics say that allowing Saudi Arabia to enrich uranium could weaken that message, even if the programme is intended for civilian use, while other commentators fear that raising nuclear enrichment levels could be misused. Saudi Arabia has long sought a civilian nuclear programme as part of plans to diversify its economy and reduce its dependence on oil. Negotiations over US nuclear cooperation have stretched across multiple administrations. Under former President Joe Biden, talks were tied to a broader package that included Saudi recognition of Israel, according to The Times. Those negotiations stalled after Israel’s genocidal war on Gaza, but the Trump administration revived discussions, removing the normalisation requirement. During Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s visit to the US last year, the two countries announced a framework for civilian nuclear cooperation, laying the groundwork for what they described as a long-term partnership built on non-proliferation standards. According to the reports, the agreement would last for 30 years and allow US companies, including Westinghouse, a Pittsburgh-based nuclear energy giant, to help develop Saudi Arabia’s civilian nuclear sector. One of its most significant provisions would permit Saudi Arabia to pursue domestic uranium enrichment following a joint US-Saudi study. Enriching uranium is not illegal and is used to produce fuel for nuclear power plants. However, the same technology can also produce highly enriched uranium suitable for nuclear weapons if enrichment continues to much higher levels. Saudi Arabia has previously said it would seek a nuclear weapon if Iran were ever to acquire one, although Tehran insists its nuclear programme is peaceful. The reported agreement is expected to fall short of the standards accepted by some other US partners. In 2009, the United Arab Emirates signed a so-called “123 Agreement” with Washington before opening its Barakah nuclear power plant, agreeing not to enrich uranium or reprocess spent nuclear fuel – a model that non-proliferation experts have often described as the “gold standard”. Reports suggest the Saudi agreement would instead allow enrichment and may not require the International Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors broader powers to verify that nuclear material is not being diverted for military purposes. Michael Horowitz, a geopolitical analyst, said the Saudi agreement would be “very consequential” for a number of reasons. “The US reportedly agreed to a deal that falls both below the gold standard and doesn’t include the Additional Protocol – both of which are made to ensure a civilian programme doesn’t turn into a military one,” he said. “This isn’t a detail: If Riyadh had wanted to just have US backing for a civilian programme, it would have done so years ago – with Washington’s blessing. In other words, the goal is to get US support for a deal that doesn’t fully exclude a pathway to a nuclear programme,” he added. “That’s not to say that there aren’t guarantees. But guarantees are purely bilateral, and that means they will be entirely dependent” on the state of US-Saudi relations, said Horowitz. Supporters argue the agreement would strengthen US influence in the Gulf. In a report submitted to Congress earlier this year, the Trump administration argued that expanding civilian nuclear cooperation would help maintain US leadership in the global nuclear industry while preventing strategic competitors from gaining influence in the kingdom. The administration has also argued that Saudi Arabia’s growing electricity demand makes nuclear energy an increasingly important part of its long-term energy strategy, despite its vast oil resources and climate well suited for solar power. Any civilian nuclear cooperation agreement must be submitted to Congress, which has the power to review and block so-called “123 agreements”. Congress would need a two-thirds majority to block the proposed agreement and override any presidential veto. The proposal is expected to face scrutiny from lawmakers in both parties over the safeguards governing Saudi uranium enrichment. Some members of Congress and Israeli officials have said that permitting enrichment could leave open a future pathway to a Saudi nuclear weapons capability, even if the programme begins for civilian purposes. Andrea Stricker, deputy director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Nonproliferation Program, urged Congress to “block” the proposed agreement. “If it does not, one hopes the policy will be reversed by a subsequent administration before too much damage is done in terms of watering down safeguards, setting negative precedents for other states, and failing to contain the spread of enrichment,” said Stricker. 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