Israel’s illegal settlements are Europe’s credibility test

play Live Sign upShow navigation menuNavigation menuNewsShow more news sectionsAfricaAsiaUS & CanadaLatin AmericaEuropeAsia PacificMiddle EastExplainedSportOpinionVideoMoreShow more sectionsFeaturesEconomyHuman RightsClimate CrisisInvestigationsInteractivesIn PicturesScience & TechnologyPodcastsTravelSponsored Contentplay Live Click here to searchsearchSign upNavigation menucaret-leftTrendingUS-Israel war on IranTracking Israel's ceasefire violationsDonald Trumpcaret-rightOPINIONOPINION, OpinionIsrael’s illegal settlements are Europe’s credibility testThe EU has documented accelerating annexation. It must now use its collective power to confront it. Journalist, writer ,lecturer, author and activist specialising in Palestinian affairs. xwhatsapp-strokecopylinkgoogleAdd Al Jazeera on GoogleinfoAn Israeli settler stands near a burned house in the illegal Israeli settlement of Havat Gilad, near the occupied West Bank city of Nablus, on July 19, 2026 [Abir Sultan/EPA]Israel’s illegal settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory have become the clearest test of European credibility, at both EU and member-state levels, and of any serious commitment to end the conflict in Palestine and reach a lasting solution. Human rights violations by the occupying power have continued since the 1948 Nakba and, over the past three years, have taken the form of a genocidal war and ethnic cleansing in Gaza. The question for EU policymakers is whether they are serious about defending the two-state solution they repeatedly endorse, which requires an end to the occupation in its entirety and all its practices. That test has gained new urgency since the European External Action Service (EEAS), the EU’s de facto foreign ministry, published its annual report for 2025 on July 17, 2026. The document provides detailed evidence that settlement construction is part of a central, integrated Israeli political project, not merely a matter of demographic expansion. The project combines settlement building, legalisation of outposts, land confiscation, settler violence and changes to governance and administrative systems, creating what the report describes as an accelerated path towards de facto annexation and the further erosion of prospects for a viable Palestinian state. By the EU’s own standards, such a description should lead its authors to recommend deterrent measures against this unlawful project. The report details Israeli measures that, by any fair reading, amount to blatant aggression against Palestinian rights. It notes that, in 2025 alone, the Israeli government approved 54 new official settlements in the occupied West Bank, excluding East Jerusalem, an unprecedented number in a single year, and established 86 new settlement outposts, including 58 agricultural and pastoral outposts. It further records plans for 63,311 settlement housing units, of which 27,941 are in the West Bank and 35,370 are covered by 56 plans in East Jerusalem, more than double the previous record set in 2023 and a huge leap from 2018, when just 11,513 units were advanced. According to the EEAS, the logical outcome of this project is the fragmentation of the West Bank, the severing of its northern and southern parts and the isolation of East Jerusalem from the rest of the Palestinian territory. Palestinian communities would be confined to separate, encircled and besieged enclaves, making the establishment of a Palestinian state highly improbable. Yet this prospective state is central to the EU’s official framework for resolving the conflict. Since the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, few phrases have been repeated more often by European politicians than “the two-state solution as the basis for ending the conflict”. The report reinforces the Palestinian narrative that the conflict did not begin in October 2023. The genocidal war and large-scale destruction in Gaza have understandably dominated international attention for nearly three years. But the EEAS document also exposes the extent of Israeli violations in the occupied West Bank, where armed resistance is not comparable in scale to that in Gaza. Over the same period, the West Bank has faced a different pattern of aggression: land confiscation, population displacement, geographic fragmentation and the imposition of settlement control as a fait accompli. The number of settlers in the West Bank and East Jerusalem is approaching 800,000, a critical mass integrated through extensive infrastructure into the institutional architecture of the Israeli occupation. To entrench their illegal presence, settlers use overt violence against Palestinians under the full and visible protection of Israeli soldiers. Direct physical violence sits at the top of the list of tactics used to impose this unlawful regime. Europe’s response to these facts, now clearly laid out before decision-makers at both EU and national levels, is wholly disproportionate to the scale of Israel’s actions and falls far short of a genuine deterrent. It may represent a step in the right direction, but only at the most minimal level, applying the label of “sanctions” without compelling Israel to reconsider the settlement enterprise itself. On May 28, 2026, the EU imposed sanctions on four entities and three individuals among settlers and the organisations supporting them. The measures included asset freezes, bans on making economic resources available to them and travel bans on the individuals. On July 13, 2026, EU foreign ministers discussed further options to restrict trade with settlements, including full or partial bans on settlement imports, stricter export licensing and possible tariffs. Kaja Kallas admitted that the current policy of differentiation, which treats settlements differently from Israel proper, has failed to curb trade with them because implementation varies across member states. At the national level, Ireland enacted legislation on July 23, 2026, to ban the import of goods from Israeli settlements in the occupied Palestinian territory. In Belgium, the government approved a draft royal decree on July 18, 2026, subjecting goods from settlements to a special national regime of licences, monitoring and penalties, implementing its earlier decision to halt settlement imports pending a comprehensive EU-wide measure. This represents a legal and political advance. The Netherlands, for its part, issued an economic sanctions decision on July 21, 2026, targeting goods from Israeli settlements in territories occupied by Israel, to take effect on September 22, 2026. Yet overall, Europe’s current policy looks more like “managing” the settlement problem than truly defending Palestinian rights or even preserving its own commitment to a two-state solution. It appears driven by embarrassment at the scale of Israeli atrocities in Gaza, massive public pressure in European streets and precedents set by the International Court of Justice and the International Criminal Court, which are reshaping electoral calculations across the EU. The measures therefore remain timid and inadequate. Yet the EU has far more powerful tools at its disposal than it has chosen to use. Its Association Agreement with Israel grants extensive trade, economic, political and scientific privileges. Article 2 states that relations between the parties and all provisions of the agreement are based on respect for human rights and democratic principles as essential elements. On this basis, Europe could impose a unified ban on trade with settlements; broaden sanctions to target those who finance, manage and protect outposts; bar companies complicit in settlement activity from access to EU markets, finance and programmes; tighten banking and investment restrictions; and condition Israel’s privileges on clear benchmarks for halting settlement expansion, violence and forced displacement. Kallas has said that the EU Council’s legal opinion allows trade-related measures to be adopted by qualified majority voting, adding that the Union can act if there is political will. Israel can absorb isolated, unilateral measures by individual states. What it cannot absorb as easily is a collective policy adopted by the European Union, its key trade and political partner. The goal is not to dismiss national initiatives but to translate them into an EU-wide stance that turns settlements and settlers from an asset into a heavy burden for the occupation. European politicians can also draw on the immense popular pressure that has emerged against Israel and its policies during the genocidal war. This pressure has taken the form of sustained demonstrations and actions: more than 50,000 protests and events in over 25 Western European countries and some 800 cities. It has also been expressed through the European Citizens’ Initiative (ECI) No. 2025/000005, which calls for the complete suspension of the EU-Israel Association Agreement. The organisers closed the signature drive on July 15, 2026, around six months before the formal deadline, after gathering some 1.3 million signatures from EU citizens. According to the campaign, the initiative met the national threshold in 14 of the EU’s 27 member states, twice the minimum requirement of seven. Signatories were not calling for yet another statement of condemnation or a vague humanitarian posture; they demanded a concrete political and economic step that strikes at the core of the EU’s relationship with Israel. Europe’s credibility crisis does not absolve Palestinian political actors of their own responsibilities. The Palestinian national objective goes beyond settlements to ending the occupation in its entirety. Yet settlements are a concrete issue on which the official EU position offers an opening for effective Palestinian pressure and tangible, if partial, gains. Confronting a systematic project of annexation and settlement requires serious internal reform, a national strategy linking resistance to political, legal and diplomatic work, and the ability to harness the shift in European public opinion. While no authoritative current count exists, the Conference of Palestinians in Europe estimates that at least 800,000 Palestinians live across the continent. Given the freedoms, logistical resources and open borders available, it is feasible to hold elections among this significant segment of the Palestinian people and produce a representative body capable of exerting pressure on EU states. The same logic applies to Palestinian communities in the Americas and the Asia Pacific region, including Australia and New Zealand. A comprehensive Israeli project cannot be confronted by a fragmented Palestinian reality. Nor can isolated national measures substitute for a collective European response. That is why rebuilding the Palestine Liberation Organization, holding genuine elections for the Palestinian National Council, renewing political mandates and embracing partnership instead of monopolising decision-making are more than internal matters. They are directly linked to the Palestinians’ ability to produce a legitimate, representative leadership chosen by people in the homeland and the diaspora. Internal Palestinian division does not explain the occupation or justify settlement expansion, but it does weaken Palestinians’ capacity to translate European reports, shifts in public opinion and legal opportunities into tangible political gains. In this changing context, the Palestinian people need a national leadership capable of understanding international political and popular shifts, leveraging them effectively and deploying them in the service of their cause and their struggle for liberation, return and self-determination. The views expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect Al Jazeera’s editorial stance. Advertisement AboutAboutShow moreAbout UsCode of EthicsTerms and ConditionsEU/EEA Regulatory NoticePrivacy PolicyCookie PolicyCookie PreferencesAccessibility StatementSitemapWork for usConnectConnectShow moreContact UsUser Accounts HelpAdvertise with usStay ConnectedNewslettersChannel FinderTV SchedulePodcastsSubmit a TipPaid Partner ContentOur ChannelsOur ChannelsShow moreAl Jazeera ArabicAl Jazeera EnglishAl Jazeera Investigative UnitAl Jazeera MubasherAl Jazeera DocumentaryAl Jazeera BalkansAJ+Our NetworkOur NetworkShow moreAl Jazeera Centre for StudiesAl Jazeera Media InstituteLearn ArabicAl Jazeera Centre for Public Liberties & Human RightsAl Jazeera ForumAl Jazeera Hotel PartnersFollow Al Jazeera English: