‘Case by case’: SC on resolving faith and rights disputes

E-PaperSubscribeSubscribeEnjoy unlimited accessSubscribe Now! Get features like ‘Case by case’: SC on resolving faith and rights disputesThe Supreme Court of India on Wednesday indicated that it may be neither feasible nor desirable for the nine-judge bench to lay down uniform, prospective guidelines on the limits of judicial intervention in disputes at the intersection of faith and fundamental rights, emphasising that such questions would have to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. The observation came on the seventh day of hearing before the constitution bench examining the reference arising from the Sabarimala Temple entry issue, which has thrown up larger constitutional questions on the scope of religious freedom and the State’s power to enact social reform. The bench comprising Chief Justice of India Surya Kant and justices BV Nagarathna, MM Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, R Mahadevan, Prasanna B Varale and Joymalya Bagchi, engaged in an exchange on how courts should navigate the delicate balance between individual rights under the chapter on fundamental rights in the Constitution and denominational autonomy and religious rights under Articles 25 and 26. CJI Kant underlined the inherent limitations of judicial rule-making in this domain. While acknowledging that the expression “social welfare and reform” under Article 25(2)(b) is broad and that the State cannot be treated as an “outsider” in addressing social evils, he cautioned against any attempt to frame rigid doctrines for future cases. “It is very difficult for us to lay down any future guidance…it will always depend on case to case as to whether the reforms fall within Article 25(2)(b) or, in the name of reforms, amount to an infringement of a religious practice,” observed the bench, signalling a preference for contextual adjudication over abstract principles. The discussion repeatedly returned to the width of Article 25(2)(b), which permits the State to intervene in religious practices for purposes of social welfare and reform. The court appeared to grapple with where to draw the line between legitimate reform and impermissible intrusion. Justice Nagarathna posed a hypothetical question as to whether a law expressly allowing entry of women of all ages into Sabarimala could be justified as a reform measure, or whether it would amount to an invasion of a protected religious practice. Senior advocate Gopal Subramanium, appearing for a review petitioner, responded that such questions cannot be answered in the abstract and would require a careful inquiry into the nature, origin and impact of the practice in question. Courts, he argued, must examine whether the exclusion is rooted in an established denominational tradition and whether it fundamentally deprives devotees of their right to worship. At the same time, he cautioned that the language of “social reform” cannot become a cloak for unwarranted interference with religious autonomy, stressing that any such legislation must withstand judicial scrutiny on whether it genuinely addresses a social evil. At one point during the daylong hearing, Justice Bagchi described Article 25(2)(b) as a “narrow window” for legislative intervention in religious affairs, even as the bench explored whether constitutional directives , including Directive Principles and fundamental duties, could inform the content of social reform. The hearing also revisited the controversial “essential religious practices” (ERP) doctrine, with the bench reflecting on its continued relevance. While Subramanium urged that the test should not be discarded entirely, describing it as a necessary tool to distinguish genuine religious practices from those merely cloaked as such, some judges on the bench expressed discomfort with courts assuming the role of theological arbiters. Justice Nagarathna suggested that the doctrine should function as a protective tool rather than a restrictive threshold, while Justice Sundresh indicated that in challenges to legislation under Article 25(2)(b), the focus may not always require a determination of essentiality. The bench also flagged the complexities involved in adjudicating competing claims within a religion, with Justice Kumar questioning the juridical basis on which courts could choose between differing interpretations or practices. Subramanium responded that courts are not bereft of adjudicatory tools and may rely on evidence to determine the character of a practice, emphasising that disputes involving legal rights cannot be left unresolved. With hearings set to continue on Thursday, the nine-judge bench is expected to further delineate the contours of State intervention in religious practices, a question that sits at the heart of several ongoing disputes beyond Sabarimala. At the centre of the debate is the interpretation of Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution, which guarantee freedom of conscience and the right to freely profess, practise and propagate religion, while also protecting the autonomy of religious denominations to manage their own affairs. The bench is tasked with answering seven foundational questions arising from the 2019 reference, including the contours of essential religious practices, the balance between individual rights and denominational autonomy, and the limits of judicial review in matters of faith.