Can Gulf countries defend themselves against renewed Iranian attacks?

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It followed a renewed US bombardment of Iran’s southern coast, including around the port cities of Bandar Abbas, Sirik and Jask, and Qeshm island. The latest exchange comes less than a month after Washington and Tehran signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) intended to halt a war that broke out on February 28 after Israel and the US launched strikes on Iran. Both sides have since accused the other of violating the agreement, with the renewed escalation centring partly on the Strait of Hormuz, where the memorandum states that Iran has control over international maritime traffic. Iranian forces have attacked commercial vessels off the coast of Oman, with the US on July 8 saying it had hit Iranian military positions it claims were involved in threats to shipping in the Strait of Hormuz. Iran responded by firing missiles and drones at bases across the Gulf where US forces are deployed. The renewed attacks across the Gulf have exposed an uncomfortable paradox for Washington’s regional partners: The US military presence makes them targets, but it also protects their cities against Iranian missiles and drones, experts have told Al Jazeera. The immediate concern for the Gulf states is whether their layered air defence networks can continue to withstand sustained Iranian attacks if the confrontation between Washington and Tehran moves towards a more intense and protracted conflict. The governments and militaries of Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and Jordan have said they faced incoming missiles and drones over the past week, and have condemned Iranian attacks. Iran has claimed that its attacks hit a fuel depot in Jordan, a helicopter maintenance facility in Bahrain, fuel tanks in Kuwait and a Patriot air defence system. Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) also said it targeted and destroyed “the FPS long-range aerial radar and the vessel detection radar in Oman”. Those claims have not been independently verified. Iran has consistently claimed to be targeting US military positions, not the Gulf states themselves, but its missiles and drones are entering Gulf airspace, striking sovereign territory, and causing civilian casualties due to interceptions or direct strikes. Qatar said three people, including a child, were injured by falling shrapnel during the interception of an Iranian missile on Sunday. Gulf governments have repeatedly insisted that their territory is not being used as a launchpad for strikes on Iran, but this has not prevented Tehran from targeting US positions and other locations within their borders. The US operates military facilities in at least 19 locations across the Middle East and North Africa, including in Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. An estimated 50,000 US soldiers are stationed across the region, and this military presence sits at the heart of the Gulf’s security dilemma. “The Gulf states are in a bind because they’re being targeted due to their relationships with the US, but their relations with the US and the presence of those bases have also meant that many of the attacks have largely been thwarted or their consequences diminished,” Simon Mabon, a professor of international relations at Lancaster University, told Al Jazeera. Gulf countries have spent decades building layered air defence networks, combining US, European, and, in some cases, Russian, Chinese and Israeli systems. These range from long-range interceptor missiles capable of engaging threats more than 100km (60 miles) away to medium- and short-range systems protecting individual military bases, oil installations and urban areas. Saudi Arabia, for instance, possesses the Gulf’s largest air defence network, anchored by US-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) systems and Patriot PAC-3 batteries. The UAE also operates THAAD and Patriot systems, alongside a version of Israel’s Barak air defence platform. Qatar has invested in Patriot batteries and the Norwegian-US-made NASAMS III system. Kuwait fields Patriot PAC-3 batteries for long-range defence, Italian Aspide launchers paired with Skyguard systems, and Stinger, Starburst and FIM-92 missiles for point defence. Bahrain has recently acquired the Patriot PAC-3 Missile Segment Enhancement system. Oman has fewer advanced long- and medium-range systems than its neighbours, but does have NASAMS, French Mistral missiles and the portable Russian Strela-2 systems, backed by several anti-aircraft gun platforms. These weapon systems networks have demonstrated that they can intercept incoming threats. But no air defence system is impenetrable, and often these defences are supported by US air defences. “What the interceptions have revealed is that US air defences are incredibly worthwhile. Even though the US presence makes the Gulf states targets, the presence of the US military is also protecting them,” Mabon said. Bader Mousa Al-Saif, an associate fellow with Chatham House’s Middle East and North Africa Programme and a professor at Kuwait University, told Al Jazeera the Gulf’s close security relationship with the United States has enabled its states to maintain what he described as “an exemplary defensive posture”. Gulf countries, he said, had recorded “some of the highest interception rates seen in recent months”. “That reflects both their continued investment in security ties with the United States and a broader effort to diversify their defence partnerships,” he said. Al-Saif pointed to the June 25 ministerial meeting between the United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), where Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Gulf leaders reaffirmed their shared commitment to regional security. In a joint statement, GCC states stressed “the need to maintain momentum and unity as negotiations proceed toward a more permanent end to hostilities.” Iran has invested heavily in comparatively cheap, mobile and domestically produced Shahed drones designed to threaten infrastructure without depending on large, fixed radar installations that can be readily detected. Many Iranian drones can be produced at a fraction of the cost of the missiles used to shoot them down, with reports stating they are produced as cheaply as $30,000. By comparison, advanced interceptor missiles can cost millions of dollars each. A sustained Iranian campaign could therefore force Gulf countries and the US to expend costly and finite missiles against far cheaper incoming weapons. “The biggest challenge is capacity, and that’s becoming an increasing concern, particularly the continued use of very expensive interceptor missiles against relatively cheap drones”, Mabon said. Iran therefore does not necessarily need to overwhelm every layer of Gulf air defences, say analysts. Instead, it can impose costs by keeping Gulf and US air defence systems on constant alert, depleting interceptor stocks and stretching personnel and logistics. The contest, analysts say, is becoming one of endurance as much as military technology. However, Al-Saif said that this advantage may prove temporary as the defence industry adapts. “We’re already seeing the defence industry respond by producing lower-cost interceptors. Over time, that will change the economics of missile defence and better match the asymmetric threats Gulf countries face, particularly from Iran,” he said. Al-Saif also added that the current confrontation remains a “no war, no peace” scenario, with both Iran and the United States engaging in a calibrated escalation rather than seeking a decisive military victory. “Because both sides are largely mirroring one another’s actions, the conflict creates space for each to replenish military stocks and prepare for the next phase rather than exhaust their capabilities all at once.” This comes against the backdrop of uncertainty surrounding US President Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy also raises longer-term questions about Washington’s desire to maintain a costly military presence in the region. The current crisis is accelerating efforts to improve military cooperation among the Gulf states. This includes the sharing of radar data, tracking missiles and aircraft across borders, coordinating warning systems and developing more integrated air defences, experts say. “What we’re starting to see is a doubling down on inter-Gulf relations and the development of shared intelligence and shared security – tracking flights and sharing air defence intelligence,” Mabon said. “We’re seeing formal GCC agreements and greater cooperation. We’re also seeing diversification alongside an over-reliance on the US, in the hope that they could defend themselves if US involvement were reduced.” A possible long-term model for Gulf states would be to retain ties with the US as well as invest in domestic defence industries. Examples include recent defence partnerships with Ukraine, South Korea and several European countries, aimed at strengthening domestic defence manufacturing and reducing dependence on a single supplier. Another option could be to expand regional military agreements, such as Saudi Arabia’s mutual defence pact with Pakistan, signed last September, which states that an attack on one country is considered an attack on both. The UAE and Bahrain, meanwhile, have deepened their security ties with Israel. Analysts say Gulf states closely aligned with Washington recognise that a functioning political relationship with Iran is necessary due to its close proximity to them. The UAE restored diplomatic relations with Iran in 2022. Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to normalise ties in 2023 under a deal brokered by China, both likely a calculation that engagement with Iran was safer than permanent confrontation. While the Iranian attacks on Gulf states have tested this idea, they have not necessarily shattered it. “Ultimately, Gulf countries can’t change geography. They have to live and work alongside Iran,” Mabon said. “They don’t want the instability that would come from the fall of the Islamic Republic. I think some Gulf states have pushed for harder strikes – not to precipitate its collapse, but to weaken the more hardline elements of the IRGC.” At the same time, restrictions on shipping in the Strait of Hormuz by Iran and the US threaten the revenues from oil and gas exports that Gulf states rely on, even if much of their energy infrastructure remains intact. The UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait and Qatar are particularly exposed to disruption around the waterway, as most or all of their ports for export lie within the strait. Trita Parsi, executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, said confidence in diplomacy to end the crisis remains low, but at the same time no nation in the region “can afford another long war”. As a result, that “will keep them away from a completely uncontrolled level of escalation”, and depleted global oil inventories will make a prolonged confrontation between the US and Iran unattractive. “All inventories have not been able to be replenished,” during the ceasefire, he said. “We are at a much lower level globally”. Gulf states have generally preferred engagement rather than confrontation with Iran. Qatar and Oman, despite being attacked in the past few days, have played a central role in diplomatic efforts between Iran and the US in recent years. Qatar’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs has warned that renewed strikes and escalation undermine mediation efforts, but it has not ended the efforts for a diplomatic end to the conflict. The Gulf states’ economic models are built on stability: The movement of trade, capital, tourists and migrant workers across a region marketed as safe, connected to the outside world and open for business. War strikes at the foundation of that model. “The conflict has dramatically affected all of these areas,” said Mabon. “The Gulf states are defending themselves right now. But the real question is whether this is the resumption of a longer conflict or simply another violent bout of posturing between Iran and the United States ahead of a resumption of talks.” Advertisement AboutAboutShow moreAbout UsCode of EthicsTerms and ConditionsEU/EEA Regulatory NoticePrivacy PolicyCookie PolicyCookie PreferencesAccessibility StatementSitemapWork for usConnectConnectShow moreContact UsUser Accounts HelpAdvertise with usStay ConnectedNewslettersChannel FinderTV SchedulePodcastsSubmit a TipPaid Partner ContentOur ChannelsOur ChannelsShow moreAl Jazeera ArabicAl Jazeera EnglishAl Jazeera Investigative UnitAl Jazeera MubasherAl Jazeera DocumentaryAl Jazeera BalkansAJ+Our NetworkOur NetworkShow moreAl Jazeera Centre for StudiesAl Jazeera Media InstituteLearn ArabicAl Jazeera Centre for Public Liberties & Human RightsAl Jazeera ForumAl Jazeera Hotel PartnersFollow Al Jazeera English: