The fall of the Assad regime and the abrupt end of Iranian influence in Syria—developments unfolding in parallel with the ongoing U.S. war against Iran and signs of diminishing Iranian power across the Middle East—have created a new regional dilemma. A fierce competition has emerged to fill the political vacuum left behind. At the forefront of this rivalry stands a growing confrontation between Türkiye and Israel, each seeking to shape the future of Syria and redefine the regional balance of power.
Syria has become the central arena for this struggle, driven by geography, strategic necessity, and the collapse of the old order. Two sharply divergent visions now collide over the nature of the Syrian state and its place in the region. Türkiye aims to consolidate political, security, and economic influence by supporting Syrian stability and helping rebuild state institutions. Ankara views this approach as essential to extinguishing the crises inherited from the Assad era, crises that repeatedly threatened Turkish national security. Beyond protecting its borders, Türkiye seeks to prevent the emergence of a Kurdish entity along its southern frontier. A strong, unified Syrian state is therefore seen as a cornerstone of Turkish national security and a foundation for Ankara’s broader regional role.
Israel sees the situation through an entirely different lens. Israeli political and security leaders regard the expansion of Turkish influence as a strategic threat comparable to the former Iranian presence. Tel Aviv fears that Iranian dominance will simply be replaced by Turkish ascendancy. It is therefore working to prevent the emergence of any Syrian or Turkish military posture that could constrain Israeli freedom of action. Israel seeks to preserve unrestricted air and ground mobility and reinforce security arrangements in southern Syria, viewing any advanced Turkish military presence as a direct challenge.
This clash of interests has intensified tensions between the two states, reflected in hostile rhetoric, repeated Israeli warnings, and military strikes inside Syria aimed at curbing Turkish influence. The most recent example was the Israeli attack on the Abu al-Duhur Airbase in northern Syria, roughly forty kilometers from the Turkish border, intended to block the establishment of a Turkish military facility at the site.
The competition now extends far beyond the battlefield. It intersects with sensitive issues such as the future of southern Syria, the Kurdish and Druze communities, the reconstruction of the Syrian army, and the broader national rebuilding process. Trade and energy routes have also become central to the rivalry, especially after the war on Iran and the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, which added a critical economic dimension to the conflict.
New regional alignments have further complicated the landscape. The Mecca Pact—bringing together Türkiye, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan—has heightened Israeli concerns. Syria’s geographic position as a bridge between these three states has deepened Israeli suspicion and pushed Tel Aviv toward greater reliance on military and security tools. Israel views Türkiye as a long-term competitor and a direct security threat, a continuation of the dynamics once associated with the “axis of resistance.” Ankara, in turn, sees Israeli actions as an attempt to restrict its influence and exclude it from shaping the region’s future. The greatest danger for Syria lies in becoming a stage for regional confrontation, undermining its sovereignty and reproducing internal conflict.
A direct military clash between Israel and Türkiye remains unlikely. Communication channels still exist, Türkiye is a NATO member, and economic ties between the two countries run deep. Yet the persistence of this rivalry increases the risk of miscalculation, especially amid the broader regional upheaval triggered by the war on Iran.
Syria cannot unilaterally end the competition between Israel and Türkiye. The rivalry stretches far beyond Syrian borders into the Mediterranean, Somalia, and the Persian Gulf, and is intertwined with Turkish efforts to assert influence in Gaza and southern Lebanon. What Syria can do, however, is shape how this competition unfolds on its own territory. It can work to transform itself from a battleground into a sovereign actor capable of setting the terms of engagement with external powers.
This strategy begins with a clear principle: Syrian territory must not serve as an open arena for settling external disputes. Damascus must adopt a balanced posture that preserves its vital strategic relationship with Türkiye without allowing that relationship to evolve into a regional security dilemma paid for by Syria. At the same time, it must avoid drifting into open confrontation with Israel, which would derail state-building and undermine stability.
Diversifying Syria’s partnerships—with Arab states, the United States, and European nations—would prevent any single power from monopolizing influence over Syrian decision-making. Such diversification would give Damascus broader diplomatic maneuverability, enabling it to use American and Arab relationships to support de-escalation and facilitate indirect dialogue between Ankara and Tel Aviv.
Syria can also position itself as a mediator capable of addressing mutual security concerns without adopting either side’s narrative. It can operate on the principle that regional security is achieved through the Syrian state rather than at its expense—a role that grows more important as the regional order is reshaped. Escaping the current predicament requires establishing a clear timeline for Türkiye’s military presence in Syria and convincing the international community that Syrian state institutions are capable of maintaining security and stability. Syria must also adopt an external balancing policy that avoids full alignment with any single actor, ensuring that its relationship with Türkiye remains strategic without becoming the sole determinant of its foreign policy.
Neutralizing Syria’s exposure to regional rivalry also requires affirming its refusal to become a party to external conflicts, its readiness to address security concerns within the framework of national sovereignty, and its support for tripartite, quadripartite, or broader regional diplomatic tracks.
Finally, Syrian geography must be redefined as a space for regional cooperation, investment, and trade and energy corridors. Offering economic incentives to states that maintain good relations with Israel—such as the United Arab Emirates, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, and Oman—and deepening mutual interdependence with those nations would encourage them to pressure Israel to protect its economic interests and reduce the motives for military escalation inside Syria.
Syria’s supreme national interest rests on a clear equation: Türkiye and Israel cannot be prevented from competing regionally, but they can be prevented from turning Syrian territory into an arena for that competition. Achieving this requires diversified foreign partnerships, a political discourse that reassures neighboring states, open communication channels with all parties, and the use of American, Arab, and international roles to contain escalation. The more effectively Damascus establishes this framework, the less its territory will be used to settle external scores, allowing Syria’s geography to become a source of strength and an opportunity for cooperation and reconstruction rather than a driver of perpetual conflict.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
The post Beyond Abu al-Duhur: The Regional Power Struggle Over Syria and Paths to Survival first appeared on The Syrian Observer.
