Armenia’s ties with Russia continue to deteriorate as election day approaches

Armenia was once widely considered Russia’s closest ally in the South Caucasus, with the two nations maintaining deep political, economic and military ties. But ahead of pivotal parliamentary elections on June 7, Armenia is facing the deepest crisis in its relations with Moscow since it secured independence from the Soviet Union in 1991.

One week before the elections, Russia recalled its ambassador to Armenia, Sergei Kopyrkin, in protest at Yerevan’s growing ties with the EU.

Kopyrkin’s return came a day after the Russian president, Vladimir Putin, warned Armenia that it was leaving itself exposed to what he called the “Ukrainian scenario” by deepening its cooperation with western institutions.

This diplomatic rift has been accompanied by economic pressure. Russia has imposed a series of restrictions on Armenian exports since late May, citing sanitary and technical concerns, while simultaneously threatening to suspend its gas deal with Armenia.

The leaders of Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, who make up the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), have also recently demanded that Armenia hold a referendum to choose between them or the EU.

A few years ago, this rift would have been difficult to foresee. Russia has widely been regarded as Armenia’s principal strategic partner and security guarantor for decades. Armenia joined the Moscow-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) in 2002 and the EAEU later in 2015. It also hosts a Russian military base near the north-western city of Gyumri, and depends heavily on Russia for energy supplies and trade.

Their partnership began to erode in 2024. That year, Armenia froze its participation in the CSTO, accusing the bloc of failing to intervene during Azerbaijan’s 2023 offensive against the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. The two countries had previously fought a war over the region in 2020, which ended with a Russian-brokered ceasefire.

The Armenian government, which is led by Nikol Pashinyan, subsequently pursued closer political and security ties with the EU and US. It expanded defence cooperation with France and publicly questioned the value of Armenia’s traditional dependence on Russia. Armenia also recognised the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court in 2024, despite the court having issued an arrest warrant for Putin.

These moves culminated in the adoption of the EU Integration Act in March 2025, paving the way for the Armenian government to begin the process of gaining EU membership. Months later, in December, the EU and Armenia formally adopted a framework designed to deepen political, economic and security cooperation.

Armenia’s westward engagement has become increasingly visible throughout 2026. More than 30 European leaders, including European Commission president Ursula von der Leyen and European Council president António Costa, gathered in the Armenian capital of Yerevan in early May for a summit of the European Political Community.

US secretary of state Marco Rubio visited Armenia later in the month and signed a strategic partnership agreement with Armenia’s foreign minister, Ararat Mirzoyan.

Russia is not only losing a longstanding ally in Armenia. It is also losing one of its main levers of influence in the South Caucasus: its key role as a mediator in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict.

Already in late 2023, Azerbaijan and Armenia initiated a process to agree on and formally define their shared border. And over the past year, the two countries have held direct bilateral talks in Abu Dhabi and signed a declaration on peace at the White House. They have also begun trade and economic cooperation.

These efforts have influenced public attitudes in Armenia. The proportion of Armenians reporting national security and border issues as the top problem facing their country dropped from 44% in June 2025 to 21% in February 2026. Russia’s regional influence will only decline further as Armenia and Azerbaijan move towards longstanding peace.

Armenia’s choice

This broader geopolitical realignment forms the backdrop to Armenia’s upcoming elections. Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party promotes a pragmatic “post-Karabakh” course. This involves acknowledging current realities, pursuing normalisation with Azerbaijan and its close ally Turkey, and gradually deepening ties with western partners.

The two main opposition forces – the Strong Armenia Alliance and the Armenia Alliance – advocate closer strategic coordination with Moscow. They blame the current leadership for the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and promise to halt the peace process with Azerbaijan and Turkey if they come to power.

The Strong Armenia Alliance was founded in 2025 by billionaire Russian citizen Samvel Karapetyan. The Armenia Alliance, on the other hand, is led by Robert Kocharyan, who served as Armenia’s president from 1998 to 2008. Kocharyan was also a board member of the Russian investment giant, Sistema. He stepped down in 2021.

The European Parliament has raised concerns about Russian interference in the election. Russia has been accused of conducting a massive pre-election campaign to undermine Pashinyan. This has allegedly involved the spread of online disinformation and a plan to transport tens of thousands of Armenians living in Russia home to vote for the opposition.

As Armenians head to the polls, they will be deciding more than the composition of their next government. They will be choosing between competing visions of the country’s future. In many ways, they will be determining whether the post-Soviet era of Armenia’s close dependence on Russia is coming to an end.

Polling suggests that the Civil Contract party is on track to win. This means Armenia will probably continue its normalisation process with its neighbours while deepening cooperation with western partners.

Yet Russia’s growing efforts to support the Armenian opposition cannot be dismissed. A different outcome on June 7 could bring dangerous revanchist sentiments, stalling regional peace efforts and slowing Armenia’s integration with Europe.

Intigam Mamedov does not work for, consult, own shares in or receive funding from any company or organisation that would benefit from this article, and has disclosed no relevant affiliations beyond their academic appointment.