Why Trump is finally ready to play his cards against China... and White House insiders can't stop him, revealed to MARK HALPERIN

By MARK HALPERIN, DAILY MAIL CONTRIBUTOR Published: 16:26, 13 May 2026 | Updated: 16:26, 13 May 2026 With Donald Trump and Xi Jinping scheduled to meet three more times this year, the world should think of this summit less as a grand bargain than as the opening scene in a four-act drama, or perhaps, given the odd chemistry between the two men, the first installment in an unlikely buddy picture. There is a reason international summits tend to be the moments when Trump looks, sounds and behaves most like his predecessors. Bilateral meetings between great powers come wrapped in choreography, military honors, translators, rigid seating charts and centuries of diplomatic ritual. Even Trump, who delights in improvisation and disruption, is constrained by the gravity of the occasion. The enduring mistake of Trump's critics is believing that he should govern like a conventional president and simply lacks the discipline or knowledge to do so. The improvisation is not a bug in the operating system; it is the operating system. Critics who complain that Trump does not rely heavily enough on traditional China experts to prepare for or execute summits such as this are missing the central fact of his presidency: he believes expertise is often a trap, process a form of paralysis and consensus a mechanism by which Washington protects itself from bold action. Whether that worldview is brilliant or reckless depends on the day – and sometimes the hour. This meeting also arrives under the enormous shadow of Iran. We will never know how the summit might have unfolded absent the sustaining instability in the Middle East. Trump is a president who likes maximum leverage and maximum optionality. Iran complicates both. The enduring mistake of Trump's critics is believing that he should govern like a conventional president and simply lacks the discipline or knowledge to do so (Pictured: President Trump touched down in Beijing on Wednesday) For Xi, too, the timing and circumstances are a bit awkward. Despite his longevity and relative openness compared to some predecessors, Xi remains something of a black box, even to seasoned China hands who have spent decades studying the Communist Party elite. His public presentation is careful to the point of sterility. His intentions are often inferred rather than richly understood. Still, two short-term priorities are obvious: Xi wants stability in the US-China relationship and he desperately wants help restarting China's slowing economy. Those objectives explain much of Beijing's current posture, including its unusually restrained tone in recent weeks. The Chinese are thankful that the summit, delayed once, is finally at hand. The White House, meanwhile, comes into this meeting believing it has quietly improved America's position in one area where China long enjoyed intimidating leverage: rare earth minerals. The United States has made real, albeit small, progress, both substantively and symbolically, in reducing dependence on Chinese supply chains. It is not mission accomplished. But it is no longer quite the geopolitical chokehold it once appeared to be. The more difficult issue may be fentanyl. Trump is likely to press Xi aggressively on Chinese chemical exports and precursor materials tied to the fentanyl crisis devastating American communities. But he is equally likely to encounter a familiar Chinese negotiating tactic: polite denial, abstract promises of future cooperation and rhetorical fog in place of concrete enforcement.  Beijing has become adept at signaling concern while avoiding measures that would materially alter behavior. As always American officials remain deeply frustrated by the gap between Chinese promises and Chinese action. Look, for instance, for the US to once again 'sell' Beijing soybeans and jets that may or may not ever actually be paid for or delivered. Taiwan, as always, lurks beneath the table. The White House comes into this meeting believing it has quietly improved America's position in one area where China long enjoyed intimidating leverage: rare earth minerals  Trump's instincts here are different from those of many hawks in both parties. He is less ideological and more transactional. That means he could very well offer rhetorical softening on Taiwan – carefully (or not…) calibrated language, symbolic ambiguity, a tonal adjustment – if he believed he was getting something tangible for the United States in return. And he is precisely the kind of president who might do so in real time, without lengthy staff consultation, to the horror of half the Situation Room and the delight of the other half. After Trump himself openly told reporters Tuesday he would discuss American weapons sales to Taiwan with Xi – a verboten topic for previous US presidents – I asked an administration official about how Taipei might react. His reply, rather than the hair-on-fire reaction typical of, say, Biden diplomats when their boss stepped into a kung pao mess, was to slough it off as no big deal.  And recall that shortly after being elected in 2016, Trump spoke directly and cordially by phone with Taiwan's president, setting off alarm bells in Beijing.  Trump, always the day trader looking for an edge, knows Americans care not a whit about Taiwan, while for Xi it is massively important. That gives Trump leverage in both directions. He can tweak Xi over it, or give him a bit of a morsel in exchange for something of more value to the US. The one factor Trump has to consider as an American equity is the comical near total dependency the US had on Taiwan for semiconductor production. This is one reason foreign leaders often find Trump simultaneously unnerving and intriguing. Traditional presidents negotiate within lanes. Trump frequently redraws the lanes while driving. Then there is artificial intelligence, the issue that may someday overshadow trade, Taiwan and even military competition itself. Trump is a president who likes maximum leverage and maximum optionality. Iran complicates both (Pictured: Iranian foreign minister Abbas Araqchi with Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi in Beijing earlier this month) Look not for the conclusion of an AI-security pact between Washington and Beijing but for the beginning of a serious conversation about one. Both governments increasingly understand the destabilizing potential of uncontrolled AI competition, especially when tied to cyberwarfare, surveillance, autonomous weapons and disinformation. The problem is that neither side trusts the other enough to move quickly amidst overwhelming complexity. And trust, at the moment, is in short supply almost everywhere. Even on Iran, where American officials quietly hope China might play a constructive role, there is enormous uncertainty. Beijing has influence in Tehran, yes. But influence is not control. Even if China wanted to help end or de-escalate the conflict, it is not clear it possesses the leverage many in Washington assume it does. Which brings us back to the larger reality of the summit itself. This meeting is unlikely to produce a sweeping breakthrough. No new Yalta. No Nixon-goes-to-China moment. No grand ideological reconciliation. The US-China relationship has become too large, too competitive and too suspicious for that. It will matter anyway. Because in the Trump era, diplomacy always resembles serialized television: cliffhangers, improvised plot twists, recurring characters and constant renegotiation of alliances and motives. The summit may not resolve the central tensions between Washington and Beijing. But it will almost certainly shape the next episode. No comments have so far been submitted. Why not be the first to send us your thoughts, or debate this issue live on our message boards. By posting your comment you agree to our house rules. Do you want to automatically post your MailOnline comments to your Facebook Timeline? Your comment will be posted to MailOnline as usual. Do you want to automatically post your MailOnline comments to your Facebook Timeline? Your comment will be posted to MailOnline as usual We will automatically post your comment and a link to the news story to your Facebook timeline at the same time it is posted on MailOnline. 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