Who Orchestrated the Backlash Against the April 17 Sit-in?
The question may sound loaded, even accusatory. Yet asking who stood behind the wave of denunciations targeting the April 17 sit-in forces us to confront two plausible explanations—and the political consequences that follow from each.
One possibility is that the backlash was not spontaneous at all, but a coordinated effort by actors aligned with the ruling authority in Damascus. The other is that no orchestration occurred, and that the uproar reflected genuine hostility among segments of the revolutionary and intellectual elite who viewed the sit-in with suspicion.
If the Campaign Was Engineered
Entertaining the first possibility leads to a clear conclusion: the authority succeeded. By mobilizing voices from the intelligentsia, the media, and figures associated with the 2011 revolution, it managed to stigmatize the organizers and deter broad participation. The sit-in’s demands—economic, social, and political—were difficult for most Syrians to reject, especially those living inside the country and bearing the brunt of deteriorating conditions. That very resonance is what made the authority nervous.
A large turnout would have punctured the narrative, promoted at home and abroad, that the authority enjoys deep popular support, particularly within the Sunni communities most affected by the sit-in’s core grievances. Preventing that spectacle became the priority. The elites who amplified the demonization—whether knowingly or out of conformity—served as instruments in that effort.
The authority also seized the moment to showcase a new image. For the first time since the fall of the previous regime, law-enforcement units appeared disciplined, well-equipped, and professionally deployed. They positioned themselves as protectors of demonstrators who were, in fact, protesting against the authority itself. This performance delivered two messages to foreign capitals: first, that the new authority would not repeat the Assad regime’s brutal playbook; second, that it alone could restrain its own supporters, some of whom appeared at the sit-in waving sectarian slogans and behaving provocatively.
In the short term, this strategy yielded dividends. But its long-term risks are familiar. At the outset of the 2011 uprising, the Assad regime neutralized the very political and civic actors capable of steering the movement toward negotiation and internal settlement. By sidelining them, it pushed the uprising toward fragmented local mobilizations, then toward militarization, and eventually toward Islamization—steps that helped justify its own repression.
That path ended with the regime’s reliance on Hezbollah, Iranian militias, and ultimately Russia. The cost of that dependency is well known. The regime never regained full sovereignty, and its collapse in December 2024 was the final chapter of a trajectory it set in motion years earlier when it dismantled the political class that could have offered a different outcome.
If the current authority is repeating that pattern—undermining organized civic actors, closing political space, and relying on short-term tactical wins—it risks steering Syria toward another cycle of authoritarian stagnation and eventual rupture.
If the Backlash Was Organic
The second possibility is that no orchestration occurred. Instead, the backlash may have reflected the anxieties of certain intellectuals and revolutionary elites who view the current authority as their own achievement and fear any challenge to it. Their motives vary: sectarian sensitivities, personal interests, proximity to power, or a sincere belief that the sit-in’s organizers represent “remnants” of forces that could endanger Syria’s unity or the gains secured on December 8, 2024.
The most consequential of these motives is the fear of a “Morsi scenario”—the belief that a popular mobilization could pave the way for a counter-revolutionary takeover, as happened in Egypt in 2013. But the analogy collapses under scrutiny. Egypt’s military was a cohesive, entrenched institution that had governed since 1952. Syria today has no equivalent. The state’s institutional architecture collapsed long before 2024. Even the armed rebellion on the Coast in March 2025, had it succeeded, would have remained geographically limited and short-lived due to the overwhelming imbalance of power.
The Assad regime fell not because of internal coups but because its external equations shifted. Had those equations remained intact, it would have survived 2012, 2013, and even the months before Russia’s intervention in 2015, when American newspapers were predicting its imminent collapse.
The fixation on the Morsi precedent is therefore misplaced. Worse, it risks suffocating the emergence of a political movement capable of maturing Syria’s public life—one that could negotiate with the authority, extract concessions, and prevent the consolidation of a new totalitarian order.
This argument is not a call for overthrowing the current authority. Such an outcome would be disastrous for Syria at this moment. The call is for a political environment that prevents any single authority from monopolizing power. Syrians have already lived the consequences of absolute rule, and the country cannot afford a return to the conditions that produced the 2011 uprising and the devastation that followed.
Whether the backlash against the April 17 sit-in was orchestrated or organic, the conclusion is the same: suppressing political space today will cost Syria dearly tomorrow. A stable future requires dialogue, compromise, and the presence of organized civic actors—not their exclusion.
This article was translated and edited by The Syrian Observer. The Syrian Observer has not verified the content of this story. Responsibility for the information and views set out in this article lies entirely with the author.
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