‘Uncouth’, but not sexual harassment: HC quashes FIR against Gurugram company boss who said ‘f*** off’

E-PaperSubscribeSubscribeEnjoy unlimited accessSubscribe Now! Get features like The Punjab and Haryana high court has quashed a sexual harassment FIR lodged against the director of a Gurugram-based company who allegedly used a profanity (f*** off) in an email exchange with a former female employee. Through the order, the Punjab and Haryana high court allowed the petition of the director of the Gurugram-based company, and quashed the FIR, along with all subsequent proceedings, including the challan. (Punjab and Haryana high court website)The high court order dated April 18 held that, though “undeniably uncouth and discourteous”, the use of profanity did not constitute a sexually coloured remark under Section 354-A of the Indian Penal Code. Through the order, the high court allowed the petition of the director of the Gurugram-based company, and quashed the FIR, along with all subsequent proceedings, including the challan. However, the director, against whom the former female employee lodged an FIR, was ordered to deposit ₹20,000 into the Poor Patient Welfare Fund at PGIMER, Chandigarh, within a month. The former female employee, who had joined the company in March 2018 as Business Head (North) at the company, lodged an FIR against the man, a director at the same firm, on March 10, 2019, alleging that he harassed her and used derogatory and abusive language against her. According to the high court order, the dispute stems from the female employee taking a four-day medical leave in October 2018, just before a company event scheduled for October 20, for which the woman was supposed to be the point person. The order also noted that the director reverted to the email, asking the woman to get the medical procedure done after the event. The email exchange continued on October 17, 2018, and the dispute escalated when the director wrote “f*** off” at some point. The order noted that the woman resigned after that exchange, which the director promptly accepted that evening. The exit, however, did not go smoothly. The company served a legal notice on her on November 11, 2018, invoking the breach-of-contract clause in her appointment letter. She replied with a list of her own: unpaid salary for 17 days in October, two months’ notice period pay, ₹25,000 towards legal fees, a written apology from the said director, and a memorandum of understanding. The company did not oblige the employee’s demands. She then proceeded to file an FIR after four months, alleging sexual harassment. The director’s lawyers argued before the high court that the FIR was timed and targeted. They said it was filed after the legal notice and aimed at forcing the director’s hand, rather than seeking justice. The lawyers also alleged that the investigation was lopsided, with none of the company’s employees examined, and the legal notices simply ignored. The argument before the court was that to proceed under Section 354-A, something sexual was required. The lawyers argued that an abusive word hurled in a heated email, with no physical advance, no demand for sexual favours, nothing remotely sexual in intent, cannot be dressed up as sexual harassment. But the complaint’s lawyer suggested that the remark was sexually coloured, and the man had used his position as director to browbeat and humiliate her. According to the state counsel, the allegations were specific enough for a trial. The high court, in its order, referred to a four-step test set out by the Supreme Court in Pradeep Kumar Kesarwani v. State of Uttar Pradesh (Criminal Appeal No. 3831 of 2025) for deciding quashing petitions under Section 482 CrPC. The four questions it asked were: Is the accused’s material credible? Does it knock out the factual foundation of the complaint? Can the prosecution meaningfully counter it? Would going to trial only waste the court’s time? A yes to all four is the bar for quashing. The court also applied the ‘Bhajan Lal categories’, under which the Supreme Court, in 1992, listed the circumstances, including mala fide prosecution and allegations that do not make out any offence, in which the high court’s inherent power could be exercised. The court held that the FIR was not required under all the legal principles applied. “The same, though undeniably uncouth and discourteous, does not, in its ordinary sense, carry any sexual overtone or insinuation, directed at the modesty or sexuality of the complainant,” the high court held in the order. According to the order, Section 354-A was not for a single rough word in a single email arising from an argument over a leave application, with no running sexual thread. The provisions are for conduct that is sexual in character: unwanted physical contact, solicitation of sexual favours, pornography, and remarks with a sexual charge. The court concluded that the said email failed to clear any of those bars, and that continuing the trial would not deliver justice but would only amount to a different kind of harassment.