SC: Courts cannot hollow out religion

E-PaperSubscribeSubscribeEnjoy unlimited accessSubscribe Now! Get features like The Supreme Court on Wednesday underscored the delicate balance between judicial restraint and constitutional duty in matters of faith, observing that while courts cannot “hollow out religion” in the name of social reforms, there may be situations where “constitutional dharma” would necessitate intervention. The court highlighted the balance between judicial restraint and faith in Sabarimala hearings, discussing the limits of judicial review on religious practices. (PTI FILE)The remarks came during the fourth day of hearings before a nine-judge bench led by Chief Justice of India Surya Kant in the Sabarimala reference, as the court grappled with the limits of judicial review over religious practices and denominational rights. The bench also includes justices BV Nagarathna, MM Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, AG Masih, R Mahadevan, Prasanna B Varale and Joymalya Bagchi. “Social welfare reform is preserved in the Constitution,” observed the CJI, even as Justice BV Nagarathna cautioned that “we cannot hollow out religion in the name of social welfare reform.” At the same time, the tenor of the bench’s queries indicated that constitutional adjudication cannot remain entirely hands-off where fundamental rights are implicated. The exchange unfolded as senior advocate Abhishek Manu Singhvi, appearing for the Travancore Devaswom Board, which manages the Sabarimala temple in Kerala, sought to draw a firm boundary around judicial scrutiny of religious practices. Singhvi argued that courts must adopt a “subjective” approach rooted in the beliefs of the religious community itself, rather than applying external or objective standards of rationality. “Courts cannot and should not rewrite the practices and tenets of a religion or rationalise it,” he submitted, cautioning against what he described as the dangers of imposing judicial notions of morality on faith. According to him, once a practice is shown to be part of a genuinely held, collective religious belief, it ought not to be interfered with except on the limited grounds expressly recognised under the Constitution -- public order, health and morality. A chief plank of of Singhvi’s submissions was a critique of the “essential religious practices” doctrine, which he described as a problematic judicial innovation. He urged the bench to discard the test, arguing that it compels courts to enter theological terrain by determining what is “essential” to a religion. Instead, he proposed a threshold inquiry limited to whether a practice is religious at all, to be assessed from the standpoint of adherents. The bench, however, tested these propositions through a series of hypotheticals and conceptual questions. Justice Nagarathna asked whether anything outside the scope of Article 25(2)(b), which permits the State to throw open Hindu religious institutions of a public character, must automatically be protected, while Justice Bagchi probed how courts should deal with activities that straddle both religious and secular domains. Singhvi acknowledged that such “close-knit” cases present a “headache” for the law, conceding that there can be no universal formula and that courts may have to decide them on a case-by-case basis. He illustrated the distinction by pointing out that while offering prayers is undoubtedly religious, activities such as financial management or procurement linked to the ritual may fall within the realm of regulation. A significant portion of the hearing was devoted to the interplay between Articles 25 and 26 of the Constitution. Singhvi argued that while Article 25(2)(b) allows the State to ensure access to public temples, once entry is secured, denominational autonomy under Article 26 should prevail in matters of internal management and modes of worship. The bench, however, appeared concerned about the broader implications of such a position. Justice Sundresh pointed out that religious denominations derive their existence from the collective beliefs of individuals, raising the question of how their rights can be insulated from the constitutional framework governing those very individuals. Justice Amanullah, meanwhile, engaged Singhvi on the evolving nature of constitutional concepts, particularly “constitutional morality”. Singhvi strongly opposed its use as a standalone ground to test religious practices, describing it as an “unruly horse” that introduces subjective and potentially unmanageable standards into adjudication. Echoing this concern, the CJI remarked that the “danger of constitutional morality in this context will be the non-manageable standards of judging it.” Justice Kant added: “The most difficult task for a court might be how to give a declaration that the belief of millions of people is wrong or erroneous.” Singhvi also sought to anchor his submissions in the idea of fraternity, describing it as an underappreciated constitutional value that must inform the interpretation of religious freedoms. He argued that a harmonious reading of Articles 25 and 26 should ensure that individual and collective rights coexist without one reducing the other “to a vanishing point”. In a factual pivot to the Sabarimala dispute, Singhvi defended the exclusion of women between the ages of 10 and 50 from the Sabarimala Temple, arguing that the practice is intrinsically linked to the unique character of the deity, Lord Ayyappa, worshipped there as a “naisthika brahmachari” (eternal celibate). He contended that the restriction is not a blanket gender-based exclusion but a classification tied to the identity of the temple, and therefore capable of withstanding scrutiny under Articles 14 and 15. Women outside this age bracket, he pointed out, are permitted entry, and devotees have access to numerous other Ayyappa temples across the country. The hearing will continue on Thursday. The nine-judge bench is tasked with answering seven foundational questions arising from the 2019 reference, including the contours of essential religious practices, the balance between individual rights and denominational autonomy, and the limits of judicial review in matters of faith.