Mowaffak al-Khouja  | Wasim al-Adawi

Under the slogan, “Knowledge is a bond among its people,” Syria’s Ministry of Endowments launched the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” charter , setting ethical rules to regulate religious work in Syria, which is witnessing a diversity absent for years due to the emergence of previously banned schools of thought and an unprecedented opening.

This religious opening, alongside the political one, has produced negative incidents that have affected the course of civil peace, which the charter strongly emphasizes, prompting the need for regulations governing those working in religious preaching in Syria.

In this file, Enab Baladi examines the charter’s main provisions, the circumstances that led to its creation, and the state of religion in Syria before, during, and after the Syrian revolution, along with the changes that have taken place.

It also explores, through the views of experts and specialists, how the current religious discourse affects civil peace in Syria, and the challenges of reaching a formula for religious moderation, especially after the bloody violence witnessed in the Syrian coast and southern Syria.

Reading the conference and the charter

A call to regulate fatwas and organize pulpits

On February 16, the Ministry of Endowments announced the launch of the charter during the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference, attended by hundreds of Muslim clerics and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa.

According to the charter, it was the result of scholarly and dialogue-based workshops between religious and preaching schools, attended by more than 1,500 Syrian Muslim scholars and clerics.

As defined in the document, the charter is a comprehensive national covenant for scholars and preachers from Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a in Syria, across their various schools, aimed at unifying their position on public issues under the Quranic verse: “The believers are but brothers, so make settlement between your brothers. And fear Allah that you may receive mercy.”

Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim, an imam, preacher, and teacher in mosques in Damascus and its countryside, said the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference represents a pivotal step in reorganizing religious discourse in the country after years of intellectual and social challenges that were reflected in pulpits and religious institutions.

According to Ibrahim, the conference’s importance lies not only in being a scholarly gathering of preachers and khatibs, but also in being an attempt to create a unifying frame of reference that redirects religious discourse toward the concerns of society and the nation.

The idea of unifying religious discourse is not new in Islamic thought, Ibrahim said, but has roots in religious reform experiences that emerged at different stages of Islamic history, when scholars sought to establish core principles, including:

• regulating fatwas,
• organizing pulpits,
• preventing chaos in religious discourse.

Dr. Ahmad Ibrahim said the Syrian conference came in this context, drawing on the long scholarly heritage of the schools of Bilad al-Sham, historically known for “moderation and juristic openness.”

During the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference sponsored by Syria’s Ministry of Endowments, February 16, 2026 (Presidency of the Republic)

Unifying discourse, between present need and historical experience

Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim said the call to unify Islamic discourse came in response to a real need imposed by the circumstances Syria has gone through in recent years, as religious discourse came from multiple sources and at times conveyed differing messages, which required, in his words, “reorganizing this sphere within a clear scholarly framework.”

The idea of unifying religious authority appeared at several stages in Islamic state history, most notably in the organization of fatwas and adjudication during the Abbasid and Ottoman eras, when there was a scholarly authority that regulated fatwas and preserved social unity.

Ibrahim added that scholars of Islamic governance, such as Ibn Taymiyyah in Al-Siyasa al-Shar’iyya fi Islah al-Ra’i wa al-Ra’iyya and al-Mawardi in Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyyah, wrote about the importance of organizing religious affairs in ways that “serve society’s interest and preserve stability.”

The conference held by Syria’s Ministry of Endowments represents a contemporary attempt to draw on these historical experiences by producing a reference document that helps preachers and khatibs unify their discourse within an approach of moderation and centrism.

Ahmad Ibrahim
Teacher and imam at mosques in Damascus

Directing discourse toward state-building and citizenship

Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim said one of the most prominent aspects of the conference document is its focus on transforming religious discourse from a contentious discussion of historical disputes into one centered on present-day issues and the building of the state and society.

He said a number of contemporary thinkers have written about the need to move from the “jurisprudence of dispute” to the “jurisprudence of civilization,” meaning that religion should serve as a factor in building civilization, not deepening divisions.

The “Unity of Islamic Discourse” charter also stresses an important principle, that the homeland belongs to everyone under the umbrella of the state and the law, a concept that Ibrahim says is consistent with the objectives of Islamic law, which call for preserving society and achieving justice among people.

He believes that when religious discourse turns to issues of education, upbringing, work, and social reform, it becomes part of a project to advance society, rather than remaining a traditional preaching discourse.

The “recognized” religious schools under the charter, in jurisprudence and creed

The charter stresses recognition of all “recognized” schools in jurisprudence and creed within the framework of relations among Islamic schools.

Jurisprudential schools, schools of ijtihad within one framework

Teacher and Sheikh Ibrahim said one of the most important scholarly foundations people should understand is that the four Sunni schools of jurisprudence emerged within a scholarly framework based on ijtihad, or independent legal reasoning, in understanding religious texts.

The Hanafi school, founded by Imam Abu Hanifa al-Nu’man, who died in 150 AH, is among the oldest jurisprudential schools, Ibrahim added. It spread in Iraq, Bilad al-Sham, Turkey, and Central Asia, and relies on analogy and juristic preference alongside religious texts.

The Maliki school, founded by Imam Malik ibn Anas, who died in 179 AH, relies heavily on the practice of the people of Medina as a source of legal reasoning, and historically spread in North Africa and al-Andalus.

As for the Shafi’i school, founded by Imam Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i, who died in 204 AH, Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim said it played an important role in systematizing the science of legal theory through his famous book Al-Risala. The Hanbali school, founded by Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal, who died in 241 AH, emphasized adherence to religious texts and prophetic hadith.

These four schools, despite their differing interpretations, all agree on the fundamentals of religion and the primary sources of legislation, Sheikh Ahmad Ibrahim said, and their differences were therefore “differences of diversity, not contradiction.”

Doctrinal schools, Ash’aris, Maturidis, and Ahl al-Athar

Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim said one of the important foundations for understanding religious discourse is knowledge of the major doctrinal schools within Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a.

The Ash’ari school, founded by Imam Abu al-Hasan al-Ash’ari, who died in 324 AH, emerged to defend Islamic creed through an approach combining text and reason, and spread across much of the Muslim world, Ibrahim explained.

He added that the Maturidi school, founded by Imam Abu Mansur al-Maturidi, who died in 333 AH, emerged in Transoxiana and was close in approach to the Ash’aris, though with some differences on issues of kalam, or scholastic theology.

In the same context, Dr. Ibrahim said the school of Ahl al-Athar, or Ahl al-Hadith, represents the tendency that focuses on adhering to scriptural texts and understanding them according to the method of the pious forebears, and was historically associated with major scholars such as Imam Ahmad ibn Hanbal.

These three schools share the major foundations of faith, Ibrahim said, and their disagreements were over “detailed issues” discussed by scholars in works of creed and theology, without leading to declaring one another unbelievers or expelling them from the fold of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a.

The need for accuracy in relaying news and information

“The religious pulpit is a great trust,” Sheikh Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim said, adding that the preacher must be accurate in conveying news and information, especially at a time when information spreads rapidly through social media.

Scholars, he said, established a methodological rule for transmitting knowledge: “If you are reporting, then verify, and if you are claiming, then provide proof.” The teacher in mosques in Damascus and its countryside said this rule remains valid today for regulating both religious and media discourse.

He added that the success of the project to unify Islamic discourse depends on the complementary efforts of scholars and religious institutions, so that religious discourse in Syria remains moderate, reflecting the tolerant spirit of Islam and preserving the unity and stability of society.

Mufti Sheikh Osama al-Rifai at the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference, February 16, 2026 (SANA)

Ash’arism and Maturidism and their place within Sunni Islam

Dr. Abdulkader al-Housien, from the Ihya Ulum al-Din Center (Revival of Islamic Sciences Center), said in a video released on the occasion of the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” charter document that the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools are firmly established within Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a, while the inclusion of Ahl al-Hadith, or the Athari school, within that framework requires further clarification and explanation.

The addition of the Athari school alongside the Ash’ari and Maturidi schools in the charter sparked debate among Syrian clerics, as it is the only school outside Syria’s traditional religious framework, to which most Syrians belong.

In this context, al-Housien raised the question: can major scholars such as Ibn Asakir, al-Bayhaqi, Imam al-Nawawi, Ibn Hajar al-Asqalani, and Imam Ibn al-Salah be excluded from Ahl al-Hadith? “If all these figures are not from Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a, then who is?” he asked.

He also noted that the schools of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a are multiple, especially in their positions on the companions of the Prophet, and that Hanbalis are part of Ahl al-Sunna, as is the Wahhabi Salafi trend in terms of general affiliation. The problem, he said, appears when some present an exclusionary discourse based on the principle that “my interpretation is a sword that cuts off the tongues of all other interpreters.”

In the same context, he asked whether Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a ever had a problem with Ibn Taymiyyah that would lead them to try to erase him.

He answered that the issue was not his existence, but the eradicationist and exclusionary discourse associated with him. Even the Hanbali school itself, he said, did not adopt all of his views on divine attributes or on the Ash’aris. Imam al-Saffarini, one of the major Hanbalis, explicitly stated that Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a consists of three schools.

Ahl al-Hadith and the dispute with contemporary Salafism

According to Sheikh Mohammad al-Housien, the problem arises when “Ahl al-Hadith” is turned into a distinct faction, because some who identify with it have become involved in attacking the Ash’ari school, which is part of Ahl al-Sunna wal-Jama’a, something he said is unacceptable. Ahl al-Hadith, he stressed, has always been part of the broader Islamic school.

He also noted that contemporary Salafism has developed its own rules in creed and introduced jurisprudential issues into them, such as considering seeking blessings from graves or tawassul, invoking God through intermediaries, as innovations. Some who reject this view are accused of “grave worship,” despite the fact that seeking blessings from the graves of the righteous was recognized by major scholars such as Ibn Hibban and Ibn Khuzaymah, which, he said, requires accepting the broad school of Ahl al-Hadith rather than restricting it to one trend.

Sheikh Mohammad al-Muntasir al-Daqqar gives a lesson at the Umayyad Mosque in Damascus, March 7, 2026 (Ministry of Endowments)

Confronting takfir and extremism

Dr. Abdulkader al-Housien said his position is based on avoiding fanaticism, and that he has no political interests with either the old or new Syrian state, adding that he “fears no blame in the cause of God.” He said the main driver of his position as a religious scholar was what happened when the Islamic State group entered Syria in 2014.

According to al-Housien, the group forced many followers of different Islamic schools, including Ash’aris, Maturidis, followers of jurisprudential schools such as Abu Hanifa and al-Shafi’i, and followers of Sufi orders such as Abu al-Hasan al-Shadhili and the Naqshbandi path, to renounce their schools and confess unbelief. Some were even forced to declare that they had entered Islam anew.

He said the group also declared its opposition to the Syrian state and maintained sleeper cells, while declaring the Ash’aris unbelievers and accusing them of religious innovation, posing a real threat to Muslim unity and social stability.

Support for the state and the “Unity of Islamic Discourse charter”

Dr. al-Housein said Tadmor Prison and other notorious Syrian prisons held detainees from different Islamic components, with the largest number coming from the four jurisprudential schools, the Ash’aris, the Maturidis, and Ahl al-Hadith.

Among them, he mentioned Sheikh Hashem al-Majdhoub, Sheikh Saeed Hawwa, Sheikh Hassan Habannaka al-Maydani, and Sheikh Adeeb Gailani, who died in confrontation with the regime.

These scholars, he said, were Sufis and Ash’aris, not Wahhabis or Salafis, showing the diversity of Islamic currents that suffered repression during that period.

In light of this, Dr. al-Housein voiced support for the efforts by the Syrian state to mend divisions and unify ranks in the face of challenges and enemies, stressing the importance of civil peace among all components of the Syrian people.

He also praised the efforts made by the Ministry of Endowments, the Grand Mufti, and Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa to produce the “Unity of Islamic Discourse ” charter, considering it an important step that should be implemented in practice.

Syria’s religious landscape, revisions and a turn toward moderation

Syria’s religious landscape changed dramatically after the fall of the former Syrian regime. After having been limited to traditional schools, which were largely Sufi in character and relied on Ash’ari doctrine, other schools emerged that followed, or approximated, the Salafi approach, from different currents, all the way to hardline jihadist trends.

These non-traditional schools had been absent from Syria’s religious scene during the former regime, which had heavily restricted them and imprisoned most of their followers. This led to the emergence of more radical trends operating in secrecy, whether in organizations or individually, but they reappeared noticeably with the start of the Syrian revolution and its militarization in 2012.

With the formation of what were then called the “liberated areas,” areas of control held by the Syrian armed opposition, these schools appeared clearly and came to dominate the religious scene. Most faction leaders belonged to these schools, including the nucleus of the current political and military authority, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, formerly led by President Ahmed al-Sharaa, as well as groups close to it in approach, such as Ahrar al-Sham and Nour al-Din al-Zenki, among others. Though they differed on some ideas, they all shared the principle of jihadist Salafism, with varying degrees of moderation and extremism.

These factions shared a doctrinal framework whose most prominent concept was al-wala’ wal-bara’, loyalty and disavowal, which requires a believer to show loyalty to fellow Sunnis and disavow those who differ. Schools differed, however, in interpreting this disavowal. Some viewed it peacefully, while more radical currents took it in a violent direction that extended to killing members of other sects, especially groups such as the Islamic State and al-Qaeda and those close to them ideologically.

These ideas differed from those of the traditional sheikhly schools that the former regime tried to lead and present as the example of correct moderate Islam. Those schools tended to avoid political issues, while their doctrinal debate was limited to argumentation and writing, away from weapons.

At the same time, many factions and ideologues from Salafi-oriented trends underwent intellectual revisions during the years of the revolution, most notably those announced by Ahrar al-Sham, and the apology issued by leader “Abu Yazan al-Shami,” considered the movement’s chief architect, who was killed in the September 9, 2014 bombing of Ahrar al-Sham leaders.

“Al-Shami” apologized for dragging the Syrian people into “Don Quixote-style battles” because of the movement’s rigid commitment to jihadist Salafism and its isolation from other Syrian currents, signaling at the time a radical change in the movement’s intellectual structure, something that also happened in other factions.

As for Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, the change was not announced openly but came gradually. It first severed its allegiance to al-Qaeda in 2016, then incorporated less hardline factions into its ranks, such as Jaysh al-Ahrar, a splinter faction from Ahrar al-Sham.

The group also showed greater flexibility in its final days, especially during the “Deterrence of Aggression” battle launched on November 27, 2024, which toppled Assad’s rule on December 8 of the same year.

During the battle, the Military Operations Administration, the body that managed the battle, sent reassuring messages to Syria’s sects and religions, especially Shiites and Christians, signaling a qualitative shift in the intellectual structure of one of the region’s most prominent jihadist factions.

Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa shakes hands with Grand Mufti Sheikh Osama al-Rifai at the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference, February 16, 2026 (SANA)

After the regime’s fall, conflict with minorities and Sufis

Does religious discourse threaten civil peace?

After the regime fell and the factions of the “Deterrence of Aggression” operation took control of most of the country, the governorates opened to one another and the schools collided. Salafi schools had previously been active only in the “liberated areas,” while the traditional sheikhly current had declined in opposition-held areas or merged with them, producing schools that combined both approaches.

After the new administration took power in Syria, members of the traditional school moved to show loyalty to the authority, and the latter did not distance itself from them. On the contrary, it gave them positions in the Ministry of Endowments and in Syria’s Higher Fatwa Council, especially Grand Mufti Sheikh Osama al-Rifai. It even went further by granting positions to some sheikhs who had been in regime-held areas.

Despite this, some clashes occurred between followers of the Salafi approach and the Ash’aris, though on a limited scale. The most notable was what happened to Sheikh Mohammed Khair al-Shaal, who was expelled from mosques in Rural Damascus.

Dr. Ahmad Abdul Rahman Ibrahim said societies passing through crises or conflicts need institutions capable of rebuilding trust among people, and that scholars throughout history have played a pivotal role in that field.

He said works of Islamic history contain many examples of scholars who mediated socially and reconciled disputes, including scholars of Bilad al-Sham who intervened to resolve conflicts among people or between different groups within Syrian society.

Islamic heritage itself affirms this role, Ibrahim said, citing the Quranic verse: “There is no good in much of their private conversation except for those who enjoin charity, kindness, or reconciliation between people,” which he sees as the religious basis for scholars’ role in repairing social relations.

The “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference focused specifically on this point, Ibrahim added, calling for a religious discourse that contributes to strengthening civil peace and avoids stirring sectarian or denominational differences.

Researcher and writer Hossam Jazmati said the previous traditional religious discourse in Syria included doctrinal and political differences among schools, but such differences did not usually produce bloody mobilization.

The “mobilizations” of the coast and Suwayda

On another front, bloody events with sectarian and denominational dimensions erupted, some at the hands of elements affiliated with the state, and others in the form of spontaneous “mobilizations” by civilians supporting the government, leading to violations against civilians.

Activists attributed these violations to the religious discourse prevailing in Syria, which included sectarian incitement against minorities, driven partly by a sense of victimhood and partly by doctrinal motives.

For its part, the Ministry of Endowments stressed in the charter issued during the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference on unified Islamic discourse” the sanctity of blood and the prohibition of violating lives, property, and honor under any intellectual or sectarian pretext.

The charter’s general features also state that it promotes “a practical discourse linking preaching and education to serving society and development, establishing justice, strengthening civil peace, and consolidating the values of good citizenship commanded by Islam.”

Researcher and writer Hossam Jazmati told Enab Baladi that the religious discourse currently prevailing in Syria is one of the main causes of the violence that occurred after the fall of the former regime.

He said the years of the revolution elevated a hardline jihadist-Salafi discourse that formed part of the incitement against Alawites, then Druze, and eventually Kurds, who were described as “atheists,” though, he said, the speakers claimed they meant those linked to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK.

At the same time, Jazmati said, the political factor cannot be ignored at all, especially as the cycle of violence began against Alawites under the framing that they were remnants of the ousted president Bashar al-Assad and the legacy of the “barrel bomb regime,” and that they wanted to return the country to “Sednaya,” in the words of those using this discourse.

The revenge factor was also influential, because many people felt transitional justice had not been pursued adequately, so they decided to take matters into their own hands when the opportunity arose, leading to these spontaneous mobilizations.

All of these factors, in addition to the sense of dominance felt by Sunni Arabs around a year and a half after the regime’s fall, created an attitude of superiority over others and a readiness to humiliate, kill, and violate their rights, Jazmati said.

Did the government tolerate incitement?

The government has faced accusations of tolerating or facilitating inciting discourse that led to bloody events, particularly on the Syrian coast and in Suwayda, especially since this discourse came from religious figures within the government or associated with it, and none were held accountable.

Jazmati believes the government either tolerated or used purveyors of hate speech as auxiliary groups in two battles, the first against Alawites and the second against Druze, where a tribal mobilization took place.

But the chaos, large-scale violations, and massacres that resulted from this put the government in external embarrassment, while the government’s attention, he said, remains more focused on the outside than on the domestic scene, so it tries to address files that cause it external embarrassment through internal measures.

“This religious discourse, which the government itself once carried when it was in Hayat Tahrir al-Sham and factions closely allied with it, is a discourse of hatred against other sects in Syria. But it has almost completely reversed since the ‘Deterrence of Aggression’ operation and what followed, because they realized the world would not accept them in their previous form, and so they are rushing to create a moderate formula.”

Hossam Jazmati, researcher and political writer

At the same time, Jazmati said this transformation is not easy, because a large number of members, cadres, and even leaders have been ideologically shaped in a certain way, referring to their belonging to the jihadist Salafi current.

According to Jazmati, the government genuinely wants to change this religious discourse to preserve civil peace, but at the same time still quietly supports it to some extent because it functions as a “heavy stick” waved in secret against Syria’s sectarian minorities. Therefore, he argues, its intention to fully realize this shift is not entirely sincere, because the theoretical foundations taught to members through the religious courses given to those who joined Hayat Tahrir al-Sham do not align with this new approach.

He added that the government constantly speaks of moving from the mentality of revolution to the mentality of the state, “but I do not know whether that is enough to reprogram thousands, or perhaps tens of thousands, of people it relies on, who hold positions in the Ministries of Defense and Interior and in civilian posts, as opposed to new people aligned with the project demanded by the West.”

Civil peace and coexistence among society’s components

The discourse at the “Unity of Islamic Discourse” conference stresses that civil peace is a shared responsibility borne by all components of the Syrian people.

Dr. Abdulkader al-Housien, from the Ihya Ulum al-Din Center, said non-Muslim Syrians also follow this conference, and are viewed as citizens and partners in the homeland.

He stressed that religious differences with non-Muslims are clear and explicit, with no room for flattery, citing the Quranic verse: “To you your religion, and to me mine.” Yet, he said, such differences do not prevent cooperation within the framework of citizenship.

He also called for peaceful coexistence among all religious and sectarian components in Syria, even with groups whose history with Muslims included conflict and enmity, so long as they now accept living as partners in the homeland and pose no threat to religion.

Dr. al-Housein gave the example of Druze and Alawites, noting that history witnessed many problems between Muslims and them, as well as serious internal disputes among them, but that conditions have calmed for now.

He stressed that they are not currently seeking to impose a new religion within Islam to fight Muslims, and that Muslims are not seeking to remove or erase them from existence, something impossible in any case and unacceptable to Muslims.

He also pointed out that Ottoman history witnessed forms of coexistence, and that some princes in the Ottoman state were Druze until relatively late periods, although some of them “betrayed” the Ottoman state at certain times.

During the first session of the Unity of Islamic Discourse Conference, February 15, 2026 (SANA)

Social unity and Syria’s civilizational diversity

Al-Housien stressed that national unity and civil peace must include all components, not only Muslims among themselves. He gave the example of Shiites, noting that historical disagreements do not necessarily mean permanent conflict, especially if the other side is peaceful and unarmed.

He cited the Quranic principle, “There is no compulsion in religion,” stressing that no one can be forced to embrace Islam if they belong to another religion, so how could that apply to someone who is already Muslim but differs on certain issues or interpretations?

He considered the conference a step in the right direction, while emphasizing that people are waiting for actions, not words, and that the Syrian state, in his view, is not seeking sedition, but trying to avoid it.

Syria as a model of religious diversity

Dr. al-Housein described Syria’s religious diversity as a welcome civilizational diversity, likening Syrian society to a single mosaic made up of different ideas, categories, and colors. No party, he said, can impose its thought and opinion on others or erase them from existence, because the nature of Syrian society is based on plurality.

He also criticized attempts by some parties to place Ash’aris, Sufis, Maturidis, and followers of the four schools of jurisprudence all in one basket and accuse them of loyalty to the former regime, considering that a grave injustice, as many of their sheikhs and imams suffered in confronting the regime and its followers.

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