Can BJP’s rise breach Bengal electoral wall?

E-PaperSubscribeSubscribeEnjoy unlimited accessSubscribe Now! Get features like West Bengal resembles a state under siege. With more than 2,000 companies of paramilitary personnel, the Election Commission of India (ECI) has deployed unprecedented security measures and reshuffled the state bureaucracy, not seen in any other state poll in recent memory. The Special Intensive Revision (SIR) of electoral rolls has left millions under scrutiny, fuelling allegations of selective exclusion. Phase 1 of polling on April 23 witnessed high turnout. While the Trinamool Congress (TMC) interprets this surge as evidence of continued public trust in Mamata Banerjee, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) reads it as silent anti-incumbency. An armoured vehicle and CAPF personnel patrol in the Bhawanipur Assembly constituency on the eve of the second phase of the West Bengal Assembly elections, in Kolkata (ANI)Can the BJP convert its steady rise and finally breach West Bengal’s electoral wall? Its path to power is challenging, but not impossible. The TMC won 48% of the vote and the BJP 38% in 2021. This translated into the TMC winning nearly three-fourths of the seats. A 10-percentage-point swing is difficult in Indian elections, but not unheard of. More importantly, the BJP can come close to a majority, or even surpass the TMC despite trailing in overall vote share. The TMC won nearly a third of its 215 seats by margins exceeding 20 percentage points. This indicates that its aggregate vote advantage was concentrated in a limited set of constituencies. For the BJP, this means writing off roughly 100 such seats and focusing on the remaining competitive ones where a 5–7 percentage point swing can make a difference. The BJP faces a structural challenge as Muslims constitute nearly 30% of the electorate and are geographically concentrated. They overwhelmingly back the TMC, except in some pockets of Malda and Murshidabad where the Congress can be competitive. The limited success of Muslim-centric parties in Bengal suggests that fragmentation of this base is unlikely. Thus, the BJP’s prospects hinges on overperformance in Jangalmahal and North Bengal, alongside strategic inroads into Greater Kolkata, a TMC bastion. This can only happen if SIR-induced anxieties deepen Muslim consolidation, and that, in turn, triggers further polarisation among Hindu voters. Voting patterns among women are another facet. According to post-poll data from Lokniti-CSDS, the gap between the TMC and the BJP among male voters was around six percentage points in 2021, but almost double that among women. This gap was driven largely by poorer and lower middle-class segments. Banerjee’s welfare architecture has created a durable female support base. Is there discontent among female voters over the handling of the RG Kar case? Can issues of safety and security trump welfare receipts? Reports indicate that while Banerjee continues to be popular, there is brewing resentment against local party machinery. The anti-incumbency sentiments expressed in silent murmurs of “ektu poriborton (small change)” explain why the TMC has framed this as a contest between Delhi and Bengal, a battle in which Hindutva is being pitched against Bengali cultural identity. This strategy of relying on macro-narratives to contain local-level discontent over corruption and syndicate politics exposes TMC’s vulnerability. Seen through this lens, two scenarios emerge for the BJP in 2026. The worst-case scenario is where the TMC returns comfortably. The BJP replicates its 2021 performance in core regions but fails to expand. Muslims remain consolidated behind the TMC, and the BJP is unable to win women voters over. In the best-case scenario, the BJP not only retains but expands its dominance in strongholds, converting narrow losses into wins. It also benefits from limited fragmentation or reduced relative turnout among Muslim voters in key constituencies. High turnout reflects anti-incumbent mobilisation rather than routine participation, possibly amplified by SIR-related anxieties. The TMC registers losses among women voters. If these conditions align, the BJP could push the contest into genuinely competitive territory. The first phase of 152 seats covered parts of the state more favourable to the BJP. In 2021, the party secured a disproportionately large share relative to its statewide tally - of its 77 seats, 59 came from this phase. It is the 142 seats on April 29 where the BJP must make a breakthrough to challenge the TMC. The TMC won more than 85% of these seats. Elections in West Bengal have rarely been a uniform contest. The state’s political culture tends to produce hegemonic parties that cannot be easily defeated on mere anti-incumbency sentiment. It is not surprising then that since 1977, the incumbent has only lost once in 2011, when the TMC ended the Left’s 34-year rule. That shift was preceded by clear signals in the 2008 panchayat and 2009 Lok Sabha elections. No comparable signs were visible in 2023 and 2024. In Bengal, power does not slip through cracks. Has the BJP found the right lever?